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THE FINAL CAPTURE OF LOS ANGELES

Although the reinforcement that General Kearny had brought to Stockton was very small -- only 60 effective dragoons were available for active field service -- it was most welcome. A leaven of regular troops gave an added strength much greater than their proportionate numbers to the force as a whole. The military experience and judgment of Kearny himself was another factor of high value and the Commodore quickly offered him the military command of all the troops, reserving to himself the functions of Commander-in-Chief and Governor of California that he did not feel authorized to give up. The General at first chivalrously declined, with assurances that he would nevertheless loyally give the full benefit of his head and hand, but finally accepted after several repeated urgings.

Nearly three more weeks were consumed in careful preparations. Cattle were driven in from the south and other provisions collected. Ox-carts were provided for carrying ammunition and other supplies. Horses were obtained. Seamen from the ships were encamped on shore and constantly drilled. Worn clothing was replenished or repaired paired. Only 200 muskets could be found for more than twice that number of sailors and they had to be armed principally with boarding pikes, carbines and pistols.

The Portsmouth and Cyane (Commander Samuel F. DuPont) had been ordered down from San Francisco and additional landing forces were taken from them to reinforce these from the Congress and Savannah. The various detachments of marines were organized into a battalion under Captain Jacob Zeilin and similiarly the naval contingents as a whole were commanded by Lieutenant Stephen C. Rowan. Counting Gillespie's volunteer company of 50 and the 60 regular dragoons the expedition totalled 600 besides 100 drivers, herdsmen and Indians.

It was a gruelling march of 140 miles that lay before the little band of sailors, marines, soldiers and volunteer civilians, that set forth on December 29th. Many of the men had only homemade canvas shoes. The way led near the present hilly inland road. Horses soon began giving out and needing the assistance of manpower to get artillery and heavily laden carts through deep sands and up the long steep grades of mere trail. The care and due protection of the ammunition and store train, and of the herd of several hundred cattle, were among the most difficult tasks.

It should be realized that Stockton's fundamental military objective was not the capture of Los Angeles but the decisive defeat of the hostile army. Once the latter was accomplished the capital could be occupied at will and the basic political purpose of controlling the general region would follow as a matter of course. On the other hand the capture of Los Angeles without overthrowing the military power of the Californians would leave the political issues still undecided and moreover place Stockton in an embarrassing military situation. His essential line of communication to the coast would be dangerously in, secure and he would face the necessity of a land campaign against a highly mobile enemy who was always able to refuse battle. A protracted guerilla warfare might readily result and, for such operations, the seamen comprising most of the American force were poorly suited.

With his present force Stockton felt confident of victory if the enemy would stand, and therefore everything pointed to the desirability of an early battle. The slow moving baggage and cattle made it impossible for the Americans to force this, however, and their best hope lay in the chance that the Californians would themselves attack decisively.

No interference was attempted by the enemy for more than a week of the march, although detachments of them were frequently seen at a distance. On January 1st General Flores sent an emissary offering an armistice which Stockton bluntly refused and his answer also served notice that the General would be shot for violation of parole if captured. Since most of the hostile officers were guilty of the some offence the threat was calculated to shake their adherence to the insurrectionary cause and thus to promote disruption of Flores' army.

Camping about fifteen miles from the Capital on January 7th, 1847, the Commodore learned of the near presence of the enemy in force between him and the San Gabriel River. Special precautions were begun against the horses and cattle being stampeded by the Californians -- favorite tactics which had so successfully been employed played against Kearny, Mervine and Stockton on previous occasions. It was this danger that fixed the American formation as a square, with the animals and train in the center, during the advance on the next day and the battles which followed.

As the awkward square marched slowly towards the river on the morning of January 8th a band of wild horses came charging at the front of the formation, but the dragoons and sailors there had no difficulty in diverting the excited animals. Again and again they came, goaded by skilful Californian cavalrymen, but each time with equal futility. Our men were well prepared for this old trick. The main body of the enemy now disputed the ford, having taken up an elevated red position near the opposite river bank and opened a galling rifle and artillery fire.

Gallantly the front line of the square waded across and cleared the river's edge of an advance party of Californians in order to protect the more difficult and tedious crossing of the men and impedimenta in the rear. The telling fire of our own seamen-manned artillery under Lieutenant R. L. Tilghman afforded invaluable support to the critical maneuver. The sketch by Gunner Meyers (Plate VIII) gives us a graphic idea of this initial effort to gain a foothold on the far bank of the river. All the while a hail of round shot and grape from the hostile great,guns was falling thickly among our men, though fortunately few were bit.

An officer distinguished through his career for efficiency and progressive leadership in thought as will as action. Herein will be found several references to his brilliant services during the Mexican War. Early in the Civil War he served on the board appointed to devise general plans for the conduct of naval operations. In September 1861, Commodore DuPont was given the most important assignment afloat -- command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron comprising nearly seventy-five vessels. A combined military-naval expedition against Port Royal, S. C. was undertaken. The Army transports were so damaged, delayed and scattered by a gale that DuPont decided to attack with his ships alone. Despite the lack of any ironclads he repeatedly engaged the defending forts at close range and forced their surrender. For this notable success he received the thanks of Congress and was promoted to Rear-Admiral. Subsequently the principal ports to the southward, excepting Savannah, were taken. In April 1863, with nine ironclads DuPont made a determined attack on the outer defenses of Charleston, but the ships were so badly damaged that he declined to renew the attempt. His opinion that the position was too strong to be taken except with the cooperation of large military forces was amply proven by a long series of subsequent attacks by his successor in command. Return to Text

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